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ABSTRACT
The term Patent Troll is increasingly permeating news headlines. This comment explains where
the term came from and how the changing landscape of patent enforcement has contributed to the
evolution of the Patent Troll. Some have suggested that segregating Patent Trolls from other
patent enforcers will solve many of the patent system's woes. This comment analyzes proposed
ways of distinguishing Patent Trolls and reveals them all as prejudicial and ineffective. The use of
the term Patent Troll is a mask for underlying fears based on real shortcomings in the patent
system, which need to be addressed.
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INTRODUCTION

An alarming problem has surfaced in the headlines lately: "Patent Troll Menace," '
"Lawmakers want 'Patent Troll' Crackdown," 2 "Patent Troll Bites Google." 3 It sounds scary, but
what does it really mean? Although it has no official definition, the label "Patent Troll" is used
with increasing frequency in a vague and subjective manner. 4
Patent Troll is a derogatory term used to describe a unique type of patent enforcer that has
emerged over the past decade. 5 Assistant general counsel for Intel, Peter Detkin, coined the term
in 2001.6 He defined a Patent Troll as an entity that makes money from a patent solely through

litigation or licensing and not from manufacturing or developing the patented invention.7 Recent
definitions of the term Patent Troll have become sharply critical.

Yahoo!, Inc. defined Patent

Trolls as "entities whose primary purpose is to prey on innovators who actually produce societally
valuable products - abuse the patent system by obtaining patents for the purpose of coercing
settlements from such innovators. '
The term Patent Troll is used as a verb in some cases, but is most commonly used as a

subversive and ugly label.9 Patent trolling, as a verb, is used to describe the action of hunting
down and acquiring unused patents to enforce against any company using similar technology to
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1Zachary Roth, Patent Troll Menace, WASH. MONTHLY, June 2005, at 12.
2 Erica Werner, Lawmakers Want "Patent Troll" Crackdown, USA TODAY.COM, June 9, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2005-06-09-patent-troll x.htm?csp 34.
3 Francis
Till,
Patent Troll Bites
Google, NAT'L
Bus.
REV.,
Dec.
29,
2005,
http://www.nbr.co.nz/home/column article.asp?id= 13937&cid=3&cname=.
4 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, PATENT LAW REFORM 3 (2005). available at
http://www.amc.gov/commission hearings/pdf/Statement Detkin.pdf (asserting that the phrase "patent troll" is now
used as "a placeholder for all the ills perceived in the patent system").
5 Brenda Sandburg, Trollingfor Dollars, RECORDER, July 30, 2001, at 1. Brenda Sandburg was speaking
with Peter Detkin, assistant general counsel at Intel, who said he came up with the term "patent troll" because he
was sued for libel after using the term "patent extortionists." Id.
6 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 3. Detkin recently stated that he was trying to
garner attention when he gave the colorful name "patent trolls" to patent claimants who were "asserting patents of
dubious value and seeking nuisance value settlements, often threatening injunctions along the way." Id.
Interestingly, Peter Detkin is now the managing director of Intellectual Ventures, L.L.C. Id. Intellectual Ventures
is a company whose stated mission is to "invent, and invest in invention." Id.
7 Sandburg. supra note 5, at 1. Detkin's definition is: "A patent troll is somebody who tries to make a lot of
money off a patent that they are not practicing and have no intention of practicing and in most cases never
practiced." Id. Detkin spent much of his time at Intel fighting claims of patent infringement coming from
companies outside of the semiconductor industry. Id. Detkin stated that in 1999 alone, Intel had received claims of
patent infringement totaling over fifteen billion dollars. Id.
8 Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 2. eBay. Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126
S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130).
9See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 3.

[6:292 2007]

Troll Next Door

the patent.1° Patent trolling is also used to describe situations where a patent holder accuses
infringement and threatens injunctive action against many companies that might pay a licensing
fee, then sits back and waits for a payoff.'' When used as a label, Patent Troll conjures images of
an archaic ogre-like monster and vilifies a type of patent enforcer that threatens businesses with

unfounded patent infringement litigation solely for the purpose of monetary gain. 12

The most disparaged type of Patent Troll is one who purchases a patent for a reduced price at
a bankruptcy auction, while having no intention to manufacture a product or to innovate further
with the invention. 13 This type of Patent Troll then seeks out corporations that appear to be
infringing on their newly acquired patent and
sends demand letters threatening the companies with
14
injunctions in order to extort licensing fees.
Companies are compelled to pay the fees because injunctions can have extremely severe
economic consequences and can significantly damage reputations." For instance, in Polaroid
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., Polaroid sued Kodak for infringement on its instant camera patents
and obtained an injunction. 16 Kodak argued that the injunction would cause the loss of 4,500 jobs,
7
$200 million in plant and equipment costs, and would injure Kodak's customers and goodwill.'

However, the court was not persuaded by these arguments, and it upheld the injunction against
Kodak. i
10 Joe
Beyers,
Rise
of
the
Patent
Trolls,
CNET
NEWS,
Oct.
12,
2005,
http://news.com.com/Rise+of+the+patent+trolls/2010-1071 3-5892996.html?tag-nl ("[P]atent trolls .... seek to
quietly acquire significant patent portfolios with the intent of threatening lengthy and costly patent infringement
lawsuits against operating companies.").
" Patent Law Reform: Injunctions and Damages: Hearingon H.R. 2 795 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual
Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary. 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Jonathan Band); see also Brief of
Time Warner, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.
Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130). The licensing fee demanded by the troll rarely reflects the true technological value
of the patent they are asserting. Id. at 7. Since the alleged infringer has already built a manufacturing process and
marketable product incorporating the patent, the troll attempts to extort close to the cost that the company would
incur by redesigning manufacturing of their product around the patent, not the probable cost of licensing the patent
before the company had built their manufacturing process. Id. at 23.
2 Brief of Time Warner, inc. et al., supra note 11. at 19.
13 See Bruce Berman, Illegitimate Assertions?, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., October/November 2004, at 22; THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT

2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
See Jeffrey D. Sullivan, Vanquishing the Patent Trolls, NEWS XCHANGE, April/May 2005. at 6.,
http://www.bakerbotts.com/files/Publication/46c75843-6976-45d4-982f-2e4f4c2l7a03/Presentation
/PublicationAttachment/8c0532c0-b lbO-4b7b-bdlb-36683a5ecd90/LESBI / 2OApril / 202005.pdf.
"[A]
cottage industry has sprung up wherein opportunistic individuals form holding companies for the principal purpose
of acquiring, and asserting, broadly (if vaguely) worded patents against entire industries, with the goal of extracting
license fees from multiple defendants." Id.
15 See Brief of Time Warner, Inc. et al.. supra
note 11, at 5.
16 Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., Civil Action No. 76-1634-Z. 1985 U.S.
Dist. LEX1S 15003, at *5
(D. Mass. Oct. 11,1985).
17 Id.
"XId. at *6. "IT]he harm Kodak will suffer [by the injunction] simply mirrors the success it has enjoyed in the
field of instant photography." Id.
I find that the public interest will not be disserved by issuance of an injunction .... and that
the public interest to be served by protection of the nation's patent system outweighs any
temporary inconvenience or one-time costs associated with staff training or other costs
associated with change-over to another model.
Id. at *8-9 (quoting Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Labs., Inc., 601 F.Supp. 964, 971 (C.D. Cal. 1985)). See generally
ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 113 (Princeton University Press 2004)
(noting that The Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal of this ruling and Kodak still had to endure a trial to
determine damages for past infringement, which lasted ninety-six days and ended with the court assigning damages
for Polaroid of $909 million in lost profits, reasonable royalties, and interest).
LAW AND POLICY 31 (Oct.
'4
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It can also be extraordinarily expensive to litigate a patent infringement claim.

19

The

American Intellectual Property Law Association estimates that litigation costs to each party range
20
from $500,000 to over $4 million, depending on the amount of money at stake in a given case.
The larger the damage award sought by the patent holder, the greater the chance that the litigation
will be lengthy and expensive. 2 1 For example, the Polaroidcase was litigated for more than nine
years, culminating in a settlement of $925 million. 22 Even if the Patent Troll's targets decide to
put time and money into litigating the claim, the troll has usually acquired the patent for a nominal
fee and has far less at stake than its opponent in a typical suit.23 If the court finds no infringement
or even invalidates the patent, the Patent Troll may nonetheless retain licensing fees previously
collected from others for the patent 4
Commenting on the proposed Congressional patent reforms of 2005, Congressman Howard
Berman of California spoke about the "unclean hands of patent trolls," but failed to define the
term Patent Troll clearly.25 Manufacturing giants that deal with numerous infringement claims
from many types of patent holders contend that Patent Trolls are abusing the current patent
system. 6 Lawyers and politicians have suggested many types of patent reform to deal with these
weaknesses, but the problem of how to distinguish a Patent Troll from a legitimate patent enforcer
undermines the proposed effectiveness of the reforms aimed at stopping the Patent Trolls.2
This comment focuses on characteristics and behaviors that are commonly attributed to
entities labeled as Patent Trolls. Part I describes the current state of the U.S. patent system and
focuses on shortcomings that Patent Trolls are accused of exploiting. Part II analyzes the different

'9 BOARD ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC POLICY, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE
NATIONAL ACADEMIES, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 12 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., The

National Academies Press 2004).
2 Id. at 58. (stating that median costs to each party of a patent infringement suit are at least $500,000 when
stakes are modest, and rise to four million dollars for each party when more than twenty-five million dollars is at
risk).
21

Id.at 112.

22JAFFE & LERNER. supra note 18, at 114.
23 Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc., supra note 8, at 2; see also ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION
COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 5. Detkin gives an example of a patent troll anecdote:

In one of Douglas Fuey's early business ventures he provided phony new vehicle titles for
stolen cars. His partner Larry Day is a one-time Blackjack dealer in Las Vegas. Together, the
two men have found a more active line of work suing cell phone companies for patent
infringement. Earlier this year their company got $128 million in damages from Boston
Communications.
Id. at 5.
24Roth, supra note 1.

25151 CONG. REC. El 160 (2005). Congressman Berman described the following motivation for change:
We have learned of countless situations in which patent holders, making no effort to
commercialize their inventions, lurk in the shadows until another party has invested substantial
resources in a business or product that may infringe on the unutilized invention. The patent
troll then steps out of the shadows and demands that the alleged infringer pay a significant
licensing fee to avoid an infringement suit.
Id.

26Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc., supra note 8, at 2.
2'Brief for Respondent at 49, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130)
(arguing that granting injunctions based on whether the patent holder practices the patent or exclusively license it is
not an equitable standard and cannot be used as an effective test); see also Lorraine Woellert, eBay Takes on the
Patent
Trolls,
Bus.
WK.
ONLINE,
Mar.
30,
2006,
at
2,
available
at
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/mar2006/tc20060330 581975.htm?chan technology technolog
y+index+page internet (asserting that a change in the system will not only affect patent trolls, it will affect
everyone). Philip Johnson, chief patent counsel for Johnson & Johnson, said, "Ifwe start watering down the patent
system... Fm worried about the future of our country ....Beware of what you ask for, you might get it." Id.
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proposed ways of distinguishing a Patent Troll and examines whether the courts can use these tests
effectively to quiet the trolls and still leave the basic aims of the patent system intact. Part III
proposes that there is no effective way to differentiate a Patent Troll, and that the attempt to do so
is a poor substitute for addressing underlying concerns about the patent system.

I. BACKGROUND

The recent proliferation of Patent Trolls has been spurred on by certain features of the
current patent system and has changed the landscape of patent enforcement.28 Some proposed
reforms to the patent system would require a court to create tests in order to distinguish a Patent
Troll from a non-troll. 29 It is questionable, however, whether the courts can make such
distinctions and what effect such distinctions and reforms will have on the patent system as a
30
whole.

A. Patent System Roots andHoles for Trolls

Patent law has its roots in the Constitution, which allows Congress the power to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."'
The current law governing
patents is set out in the Patent Act of 1952.32 Congress intended this Act to create a delicate
balance that gives the public access to new ideas in exchange for the inventor's exclusive right to
the patent.33
One frequent accusation associated with Patent Trolls is that there are too many patents of
questionable quality that have been granted in the recent past, giving the trolls an opportunity to
acquire and enforce vague patents against countless companies. 4 Activity in the United States
Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"), including patent applications received and patents
issued, increased by 80% from 1990 to 2000 and increased by 250% from 1980 to 2000. 31 Patent
system critics commonly complain that the USPTO does not have a sufficient number of
technically skilled patent examiners to effectively research and grant only truly innovative
patents. 36 A look at the statistics reveals that the number of patents granted in the United States
2 Brief of Amicus Curia Yahoo! Inc.. supra note 8, at 4.

29Beyers, supra note 10. Joe Beyers, the IP-licensing chief at Hewlett-Packard, asserts that it is time for big
industry to fight back against the patent trolls. Id.His recommendation is to create a "standardized definition of a
patent troll with guidelines to distinguish trolls from operating companies seeking fair value for their inventions."
Id.
3(See Brief for Respondent. supra note 277, at 49. "[D]istinguishing between licensors of patents on the
basis of whether they license exclusively (apparently upstanding behavior) or whether they license non-exclusively
(apparently 'troll-like' behavior) makes no sense: courts should not adopt an equitable rule that disfavors those who
license freely." Id.
31U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.
8.
32The Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
33DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (Robert C. Clark et al.

eds., 2nd ed. Foundation Press 2001) (1998) ("[P]atent law seeks to strike a balance between the promotion of
technological innovation and the dissemination of its fruits.").
34Jason Kirby, Patent Troll or Producer?,FIN. POST, Jan. 14, 2006, at 1.
35 CRAIG HOVEY,

PHD. THE PATENT PROCESS A GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY FOR THE

INFORMATION AGE 1 (John Wiley & Sons. Inc. 2002).
36JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 188, at 12. The organization of the patent office accentuates the debilitating
effect of the recent patent avalanche. Id.The PTO is chronically strained for resources and qualified examiners are
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was
growing at approximately 1%per year from 1930 to 1982 and then jumped to a growth rate of
5 7
. % per year from 1983 to 20027 Currently, the USPTO receives about 350,000 patent
applications per year and grants about 177,000 a year. 38 At the same time, the increase in patent
examiners has not kept up with the number of patents applied for, which some argue results in the
USPTO granting too many broad or vague patents. 39 This allows an owner of a broad or vague
patent to make infringement allegations against any user of similar technology across a wide range
of industries 4.
The explosion of new patents, coupled with the presumption that a granted patent is valid,41
creates an uphill battle for those wishing to challenge a patent holder that is asserting a claim of
infringement. 42 In 1982, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC"),
which provides a centralized forum for patent appeals. 43 Before the CAFC, the federal appellate
courts found that a patent was valid and infringed in less than thirty percent of cases, varying
widely by circuit. 44 Between 1982 and 1986, CAFC holdings in favor of the patent holder
increased to sixty-eight percent of the cases.45 The CAFC has created an environment where
patent holders, trolls or otherwise, have a greater chance of succeeding in getting damages for an

infringement claim.46
As stated earlier, another common criticism of Patent Trolls is that they threaten the use of an

injunction against accused patent infringers, which is an inappropriately severe remedy in some
cases. 47

With the grant of a patent from the USPTO, the patent holder obtains the "right to

difficult to find, especially in the areas of software, financial methods, and biotechnology. Id. There was also a
change made to the PTO in the early 1990s, that changed the USPTO from an agency funded by tax revenues into
one funded by the fees it collects. Id. at 2. A consequence of this change is that the USPTO must serve the patent
applicants to retain its funding, and what patent applicants want is for their applications to be granted. Id. The
USPTO's attempt to serve its customers has resulted in a perceived decline in the rigor of reviewing patent
applications and thus has encouraged more people to apply for dubious patents. Id. at 11.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
39Id
40 See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting,
in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., MIT Press 2001). The explosion in
the number of patents granted in new technology areas and the fact that highly technical products incorporate many
patents has been termed the "patent thicket." Id.
4 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (stating that a patent shall be presumed valid and the burden of establishing
invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof rests on the party asserting invalidity).
42 Brief for Amicus Curiae Computer & Communications Industry Association in Support of Petitioners at 9,
eBay Inc. & Half.Com, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130) ("[Patents are cloaked
in an] artificially enhanced presumption of validity, so that challengers must show by 'clear and convincing'
evidence that the patent should not have been granted.").
43 CHISUM, supra note 333, at 25.
44 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 188, at 99. Before the CAFC, the appellate courts of the various circuits
interpreted patent law very differently and the Supreme Court was reluctant to hear appeals in patent-related cases.
Id. This led to widespread "forum shopping" in patent cases. See id. Congress created the CAFC because they
perceived these factors to be undermining the effectiveness of patent protection and threatening U.S. technological
and economic strength. Id. at 100. But see Brief of Petitioners at 48, eBay Inc. & Half.Com, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130) (asserting that forum shopping still continues even after the creation of
the CAFC). "[D]espite the creation of the Federal Circuit, choice of forum continues to play a critical role in the
outcome of patent litigation." Id. (quoting Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping Patent Cases: Does Geographic
Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889. 891 (2001)). The town of Marshall, Texas. has a population of
25,000, but patent cases filed there almost doubled from 2003 to 2004 and the number is still rising. Id. But see
Allen Pusey, Marshall Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 26, 2006, at ID (giving more background about the
appeal of Marshall. TX to intellectual property litigators and the connection to "patent trolls" and "patent pirates").
45JAFFE & LERNER. supra note 188, at 106.
46 Id.
47 Brief for Computer & Communications Industry Association, supra note 422, at 6.
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exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States. ' , 4' The Patent Act also provides that courts may grant injunctions to prevent the
violation of any right of the patent holder. 49 The consequences of an injunction can be so grave
that many companies feel coerced into paying a Patent Troll's requested licensing fee.50 An
injunction is such an extreme remedy that some argue it should not be available to a Patent Troll.51
For many years, the courts
granted an injunction to virtually any patent holder that prevailed in
52
infringement litigation.
In May 2006, the standard for granting a permanent injunction in a patent case was clarified
by the Supreme Court in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C.5 3 The Court rejected the CAFC rule
that "a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged. 54
The Supreme Court also denounced the District Court's contention in that case that any patent
holder willing to license its patents and having a "lack of commercial activity in practicing the
patents" categorically cannot qualify for injunctive relief.55 The rule is that any patent holder
56
satisfying the four factor test for injunctive relief will be granted a permanent injunction.
This
case and other multimillion dollar disputes have focused a great deal of attention on the issue of
whether Patent Trolls should be distinguished from other patent holders.5

B. Development and Landscape of Patent Enforcement

The primary value of holding a patent is the right to exclude others from the manufacture,
use, or sale of the patented article.5" The U.S. Supreme Court has said that exclusion is "of the
very essence of the right conferred by the patent."59 However, in the patent system's early days, it
was woefully difficult for an inventor to enforce the right to exclude others.60
Some inventors, like Eli Whitney and Robert Kearns, spent the better part of their lives
trying to enforce patent rights against notorious infringers. 6 1 Kearns patented the intermittent
windshield wiper in 1967, and he fought until 1990 to negotiate his first settlement with Ford
Motor Company for infringement. 62 The courts ignored Eli Whitney for ten years when he
48The Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
49Id.§ 283. The Patent Act states: "The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant

injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on
such terms as the court deems reasonable." Id.
50Brief for Computer & Communications Industry Association, supra note 42, at 6.
51JAFFE & LERNER. supranote 188, at 112 (asserting that courts historically refused to grant an injunction to
shut down an infringing firm when the patentee was not itself manufacturing the patented product, but the CAFC
has "shown more flexibility in this regard, thereby handing individual inventors a powerful weapon"); see also
Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo!, Inc. supra note 8, at 3.
52eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837. 1841 (2006). "From at least the early 19th century.
courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases." Id
53Id.
54Id.at 1841.
55Id. at 1840.
56Id. at 1839.
57See generally Beyers, supra note 10.
5 Donald G. Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 868 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
59Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
60 See Mike Hofman, PatentFending,INC., Dec., 1997, at 113.
61 Id. Kearns set up a business specifically to litigate his patent infringement claims, and the corporate office
was located across the street from the federal courthouse in Detroit. Id. Kearns was ordered to pay sanctions after
his son, Dennis, obtained confidential documents by dating a paralegal at one of the firms representing the several
automakers being sued. Id.Kearns ended up winning more than thirty million dollars from Ford and Chrysler. Id.
62Id.at

113.
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accused others of infringing his cotton gin patent. 6, In a letter to a friend in 1803, Whitney wrote,
"I have a set of the most Depraved villains to combat and I might almost as well go to Hell in
search of Happiness as apply to a Georgia-Court for Justice. 64 Whitney eventually collected
nearly $90,000 in patent royalties, but he only had a few thousand dollars left after paying his
legal bills for the ten-year struggle.65
A middle ground emerged in patent enforcement when some attorneys began to take patent
infringement cases on a contingent fee basis. 66 One such attorney was Gerald Hosier, a so-called
"maverick" attorney, who represented Jerome Lemelson beginning in 1989 in a lawsuit against
Mattel Toys.6 A jury awarded Lemelson $24.8 million and the judge adjusted the award to $71
million to include interest.68 Unfortunately for Lemelson, the CAFC reversed the finding of
infringement and he and his attorney received nothing.69 Paul Ware had a more successful venture
into contingent fee patent representation. 70 Ware patented his identification card system invention
in 1987, but failed to generate any revenue from it until Acacia Research Corporation called him
in 2004 and offered to help. 7' Acacia contacted Ware when they noticed that a portion of his
patent covered the use of a unique number to identify each credit card transaction. 72 Acacia
successfully collected millions of dollars in licensing fees from about thirty companies for Ware.73
Ware claims that without Acacia's help, he never would have been able to afford to enforce his
patent against the alleged infringers.74
The problems with the patent system coupled with the increasingly lucrative business of
enforcing patents have contributed to the rise in the number of Patent Trolls. 75 This comment
discusses whether a distinction between a Patent Troll and other patent holders presents an
effective solution to the patent system's woes. To answer this question, different traits that
commonly characterize Patent Trolls are considered individually to determine which ones might
be useful in segregating the Patent Troll from other patent enforcers.

II. ANALYSIS

63 Stephen

Yafa, The Man Who Made Cotton King, INVENTION & TECH., Winter 2005, at 50 (detailing Eli

Whitney's struggle against rampant infringement of his cotton gin patent and the frustration of being turned away
from the courts).
14 Id. at 52 (emphasis in original).
65 Id. at 57.
16

See Joseph N. Hosteny, Who Says ContingentFee Lawyers Are the Biggest Moneymakers?, 1NTELL. PROP.

TODAY, August 2005, at 18.
67 Adam Goldman, A Great Inventor, or a Big Fraud,LOS ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, at I (discussing
how Lemelson attorney, Hosier, gambled and took patent cases on contingency in 1989, and it was considered a

new and unusual arrangement).
"
Lemelson v. Mattel, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202. 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
69 Id. at 1208 (finding that "no reasonable jury" could find that Lemelson's patent was valid and infringed);
Goldman, supra note 67, at 1. Before the CAFC ruling, Mattel offered Lemelson a twenty million dollar settlement,
which he and his attorney refused. Id. In June 1992, the CAFC issued a unanimous decision in favor of Mattel. Id.
70 Kirby, supra note 344, at I (detailing Ware's attempts to market his identification card and transaction
system, including that the patent was granted in 1987 and his attempts at marketing included contacting Donald

Trump and Ted Turner's son-in-law, but to no avail).
71 Id.
72 id.

73 Id. Mr. Ware calls Acacia his "saviour." Id. He said, "Many patents have referenced my patent, but I
couldn't afford to litigate. Without Acacia. it would have been infringed on by all these big companies." Id. Some
companies that paid licensing fees include Exxon Mobil. Gap. Giorgio Armani, and RadioShack. Id.
74 id.
75Beyers, supra note 10.
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The most heavily criticized characteristics of Patent Trolls are that they do not practice the
patent they hold,7 6 and that they make frivolous allegations of infringement.72 Some critics argue
that patents should not be enforced like traditional property rights, but should only be enforced
when doing so serves the public good. 78 Part A of this section analyzes whether isolating Patent
Trolls on the basis of whether they are "practicing" the patents they hold is feasible. Part B of this
section analyzes whether making frivolous allegations is a useful basis for defining who is and
who is not a Patent Troll. Part C of this section examines whether enforcing patents only for the
public good can help differentiate a Patent Troll from other patent holders.

A. Non-practicingEntities
A 2003 report by the Federal Trade Commission used the term "non-practicing entities"
("NPEs") to refer to Patent Trolls. 79 This term highlights the characteristic most frequently used
to identify a Patent Troll; whether or not the patent holder practices the patent.80 In Continental
Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., the Supreme Court stated that a patent holder has "the
privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it, without question of the motive."'"
Nevertheless, one of the main complaints made by8 defendants
in infringement actions is that the
2
patent holder is not using or "practicing" the patent.
The term "practicing" a patent can refer to product manufacture or new product
development, but merely licensing or litigating is not included.83 The CEO of Rates Technology
is the inventor of the patents the company holds, but because Rates is not making any products,

76

See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 444, at 24 (expressing concern about "non-practicing entities"); Brief

for Computer & Communications Industry Association, supra note 422, at 14 ("Easily asserted patents, endowed
with automatic injunctive relief, become potent weapons in the hands of non-producing patent firms, sometimes
referred to as 'trolls."'). Brief of Research in Motion, Ltd. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2. eBay,
nc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130).
Ever growing numbers of companies are acquiring patent portfolios and using these patent
portfolios to extract royalties from existing products and services. These patent assertion
companies do not use their patents and know-how to make new products or services available
to the public . . . their sole activity is to identify existing products or services in the
marketplace against which they can assert their patents.
Id. at 2.
77See Berman, supra note 13, at 22 (stating that the term patent troll has become synonymous with the unfair
assertion of questionable IP rights).
78Brief of Malla Pollack et al., Supporting eBay Inc., et al., at 17, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.
C. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130).
The United States Constitution defines the public interest goal of patent statutes as the
distribution of new technology. A patentee who does not practice his or her invention within
the United States is undermining the public interest which founds legal recognition of personal
patent rights. Therefore, a patent holder who is neither practicing the infringed invention nor
making a good-faith effort to prepare to practice the invention should be presumed to fail the
public interest prong [of the test to determine whether a patent holder can obtain an injunction
when their patent is infringed].
Id. at 17.
79THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 31 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
8oId.
XI Cont'l

Paper Bag Co. v. E.Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).

82 See Brief of Malla Pollack, supra note 78, at 17.
83 THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 17.
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commentators still refer to the company as a Patent Troll. 4 Rates Technology's main business is
licensing, and it has arranged licensing agreements for its patents with over 700 companies and
has also sued Google for infringement.8 5 Because Rates Technology has no other corporate
activity besides
IP litigation and licensing, the media sees them as an NPE and has labeled them a
6
Patent Troll.
A contrasting example is Eastman Kodak Co., a company which recovered nine-two million
dollars from Sun Microsystems for infringement on a patent that Kodak had inherited and was not
using.8 7 No one has ever called Kodak a Patent Troll, even though it was not "practicing" that
particular patent.8 8 Many large manufacturers create a strategic advantage by holding unused
patents in their patent portfolio, and forcing competitors to come to them for licenses in order to
use the patented technology. 9 Also, many individual inventors hold patents on their inventions,
but they have neither the expertise, nor the money to manufacture them. 9 They could also be
called NPEs and would be excluded from enforcing their patent rights if this characteristic were
used to identify and weed out Patent Trolls. 91
An identifying feature of an NPE is that the majority of revenue coming into the company is
from licensing patents. 92 One example is NTP, Inc., a small Virginia corporation formed by one
inventor and one lawyer, whose sole lucrative business practice has been to license the patented
technology of the inventor. 93 In March 2006, NTP negotiated a $612.5 million dollar settlement

84 Till,

supra note 3.

85id.
86 See id.
87 Martin Lueck et al., "Patent Troll:" A Self-Serving Label that Should be Abandoned, Sept. 28, 2005,

http://www.rkmc.com/Patent Troll A Self-Serving Label that Should be Abandoned.htm.
88 Id. (stating that under many definitions of a patent troll, Kodak would appear to be engaging in improper
conduct, when in fact they are merely operating within the rules of the system). Individuals and organizations
enforcing patent rights, whether invented or acquired, whether a manufacturer of patented technology or not, are
exercising a legal right, and that constitutional right should not be denied. Id.
89 JAFFE & LERNER. supra note 188, at 57. An early example is Texas Instruments, who had "virtually no
licensing revenues when it decided to assert a number of the patents in its portfolio against its competitors in the
mid 1980s. This strategy was so successful that by 1999, the firm was estimated to be earning $800 million from
patent licensing revenues, which represented more than 55% of Texas Instrument's total net income." Id.
"' Lueck et al., supra note 88.
91 U.S. Debates Restriction o "Patent Trolls", TAIPEI TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005, at 11, available at
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2005/03/21/2003247222.
Peter Detkin stated, "the term 'patent
troll' [should not] apply to all patent owners who demand royalties from others without making the product
themselves. Thomas Edison never made any products. We have to be careful because a lot of the behavior we're
talking of curbing would have curbed Thomas Edison." Id. Edison had more than 1000 patents and founded a
company that later became General Electric, Co., the world's second-biggest company by market value. Id.
92
Everyone Sick of BlackBerry Patent Battle, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov.
21,
2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,176239,00.html; see also William M. Bulkeley, Patent litigants pose
growing threat to business, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2005, at Al; Chris Carson, "Patent Trolling" Firms Sue Their
Way to Profits. MSNBC.COM. Mar. 18. 2006. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11860819/from!RSS/. An example is
Forgent Networks, with thirty employees and a law firm, who made eighty percent of their revenue in the last
quarter of 2005 from licensing deals on just one digital image patent it obtained years ago in an acquisition. Id.
The company's CEO, Dick Snyder, says, "This country was built on innovation, and in the Constitution there is a
provision in there to protect innovation through patenting. It's the American way, and we're just doing what we
believe is the right thing to gain value from what we own." Id. But see JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 18, at 57
(noting Texas Instruments makes fifty-five percent of revenue from licensing, but has not been labeled a patent
troll).
93 See Everyone Sick, supra note 92. NTP was co-founded by Thomas J. Campana. Jr. and a northern
Virginia attorney, Don Stout to protect the patent obtained by Campana for a system to send e-mails between
computers and wireless devices. Id.
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from Research in Motion Ltd. for the Blackberry device's infringement on NTP's patent. 94 The
settlement constituted the vast majority of NTP's income, and they were consequently labeled a
Patent Troll by the media. 95
However, the revenue earned from a patent cannot reliably be used to determine who is an
NPE or a Patent Troll. For instance, in 2000, IBM earned $1.7 billion solely from licensing its
patents. 96 Since that was only about fifteen percent of their profits, commentators do not vilify the
company as they do Patent Trolls. 97 With more manufacturers and technology companies
generating revenue from their intellectual property holdings, any line drawn based on revenue
from patents is sure to lump together legitimate and useful licensing activity along with alleged
Patent Trolls.98
From these examples, it is clear that diminishing patent enforcement rights for entities that
do not practice their patent or that earn the majority of their income from patents is not an
equitable solution to the Patent Troll dilemma.

B. Frivolous Claims

A common assertion by victims of Patent Trolls is the infringement claims made against
them are frivolous. 99 Philip Swain, a Boston lawyer who frequently defends parties in patent
infringement lawsuits, believes that "[c]ompanies who do the costly grunt work of actually
developing and marketing new technologies are being held ransom by tiny outfits whose only
assets are 'kooky and vague' patents."100 One such instance involves a travel agent turned
inventor who procured two patents for browser operations."' He claimed that his patents were
infringed by any web site containing information vaguely described as being "from various textual
and graphical information data sources."' 112 He filed suit against eleven small companies,
including a small family-owned business, selling their products online.103 Some of the defendants
found the claim absurd and joined together to fight the patent holder in court, resulting in the court
invalidating the patent. 104

94 Richard
Drew, Settlement Reached in BlackBerry Patent Case, Mar.
3.
2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id I 1659304.
95Bruce T. Neel, Patent Trolls Patent Owners Holding Tech Companies Hostage, ARIZ. Bus. MAG.. MayJune 2005, at 43.

96See Pete Barlas, 1BMlfCashing In Patents Via Web, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Aug. 6, 2001, at A6.
97Id.

9'U.S. Debates, supra note 911, at 11.
99Sullivan. supra note 14.
100Kirby, supra note 344, at 1.

101 Roth, supra note 1; Sam Costello, Company Claims Patent On "Millions" of e-Commerce Sites,
1NFOWORLD, May 15, 2002, http://www.infoworld.com/articles/hn/xml/02/05/15/020515
hnpangea.html. When the president of Dickson Supply received notice that his e-commerce website
infringed on Lawrence Lockwood's patent, he thought, "Ifthey're going after us ... they have to be going after
everybody in the whole U.S. with a web site." 1d.; see also Paul Davidson, Patents Out of Control?, USA TODAY.
Jan. 13. 2004, at 2B (noting that Lawrence Lockwood sued fifty small e-commerce companies, many of which
settled for one-time fees of less than $30,000 rather than pay the costs of litigation).
102Costello, supra note 101. The allegedly offending defendants had also infringed Lockwood's second
patent when they used an "automated financial transaction processing system" where a computer can "acquire credit
rating data relating to the applicant from the credit rating service." Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
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Another much more prolific enforcer of allegedly frivolous claims was Jerome Lemelson.105
Lemelson received more than 500 patents in his lifetime and the foundation he created to enforce
his patents has earned $1.5 billion in licensing fees. 1 6 However, some say that he was more of a
"science fiction writer" because most of his patents were so broad and vague they were effectively
nonsense. 10 7 In September 2005, the CAFC affirmed a decision in favor of the multiple
defendants sued by Lemelson's corporation for infringement on seventy-six asserted patent
claims.10 8 The court ultimately found that Lemelson's patents were invalid for lack of written
description and enablement. 1 °9 While explaining how frivolous some claims of infringement are,
David Simon, chief patent counsel of Intel, referred to an accusation of infringement Intel received
from the owner of a patent for a drill used to make a hacksaw blade that he believed Intel was
infringing upon.110 Simon resented the time he had to spend explaining to the patent holder that
Intel had absolutely nothing in their products or processes that even vaguely resembled his
patented hacksaw blade drill.111 It may be true that some Patent Troll infringement claims are
frivolous, but the validity of a claim is determined in court and there is no way to distinguish in
advance whether a Patent Troll or any patent holder is making a frivolous claim before the court
makes its ruling.
The final determination of frivolity of the claim comes from the court.112 The court can
impose Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11113 sanctions and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
("FRAP") 3g114 sanctions, respectively, for bringing frivolous claims or appeals. In 1996, the
CAFC imposed FRAP 38 sanctions against S. Bravo Systems ("Bravo") and its attorneys for filing

105 Daniel S. Burges, Lemelson Patents Ruled Invalid, Unenforceable and Not Infringed, PHOTONICS

BusINEss WORLD, Mar. 2004. available at http://www.photonics.com/content/spectra
/2004/March/business/67917.aspx; see also Goldman. supra note 69, at 1.
106 Burges, supra note 105.
107 Goldman, supra note 69, at I. Robert Shiliman, chief executive of Cognex Corporation, who sued
Lemelson's foundation after they initiated litigation against many Cognex customers for infringement of
Lemelson's patent. Id. Goldman states that Lemelson's detractors claim his patents were in fact worthless and he
was one of the great frauds of the twentieth century. Id. The machine vision patent at issue was a 150 page patent
application filed on Christmas Eve in 1954 by Lemelson. Id. It contained diagrams showing how a robot could
perform a variety of fantastic tasks during industrial production. such as riveting, welding, and transport. Id. It also
showed how a robot, armed with a camera, could serve as the quality control inspector and mange jobs that the
human eye could not. Id. This is the same patent that was overturned because the court found that no one could
have built current machine vision technology from the fanciful sketches in the 1954 patent. and it lacked
enablement. Id.; see also Burges, supra note 105. Lemelson received more than 500 patents over his lifetime, the
first for an improvement on the propeller beanie in 1953; his foundation holds more than 180 of his unexpired
patents and pending claims. Id.
08 Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., 422 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (stating that Lemelson had waited eighteen to thirty-nine years to file the infringement claims in this case).
109Id. at 1381 82; see also Burges, supra note 105. Lemelson and his attorney were able to collect royalties
for the machine vision and bar-code scanning patents from 979 businesses in a multitude of sectors before these
patents were found invalid. Id.
110U.S. Debates, supra note 91, at II.
1 Id.
12 Lueck et al.. supra note 87.
"To the extent anyone knowingly abuses the patent system. by bringing
frivolous suits to obtain nuisance settlement agreements. there are already remedies in place to address such
situations, including sanctions under Rule II and the recovery of attorneys fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285." Id.
113 FED. R. Civ. P. 1 I(b)(2). An attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that "the claims, defenses, and

other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument." Id.
114 FED. R. APP. PROC. R 38.
"If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a
separately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and
single or double costs to the appellee." Id.
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a frivolous appeal. 115 In S. Bravo Systems, Inc. v. Containment Technologies Corp., Bravo had
filed suit against Containment Technologies Corporation ("CTC") for infringement of a patent on
a secondary containment system leak-signaling device, and the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of CTC on all claims. 116 The Court of Appeals noted, "[t]he infirmities of
Bravo's appeal as filed were exacerbated by representations made in Bravo's briefs and in oral
argument that lacked legal or factual support., 117 Some patent infringement claims are frivolous,
but only a court can make that determination and there are existing sanctions when parties attempt
to waste the court's time in this manner."'
Some of the most infamous Patent Trolls have had their claims of infringement validated by
the courts, so they cannot be called frivolous claims.1 19 Notorious Patent Troll NTP had its patent
infringement claim validated in court. 12 Even though the media vilified NTP as a small Patent
Troll trying to bring down the useful and popular Blackberry device, the judge found that the
Blackberry device did infringe on NTP's patent. 121 Therefore, frivolous claims cannot be used as
a useful characteristic to identify a Patent Troll in advance of litigation.

C. Are PatentsProperty?

Some commentators suggest that the key to taking the bite out of Patent Trolls is to limit the
rights conferred by a patent and to treat it as a different type of property. 122 A patent is now
treated the same as other property, so a patent holder can exclude others from using the invention
no matter what the circumstances or motivation for doing so. 123 One current proposal for patent
system reform is to allow a patent holder to exclude others from using the patented invention only
when it serves the public good. 124
125
According to current U.S. patent law, patents have the "attributes of personal property."
In Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., the Supreme Court stated "it was

decided that patents are property, and entitled to the same rights and sanctions as other
property." 126 However, in the dissent of Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, three justices agreed that it
is inconsistent with the Constitution and patent legislation to treat a patent as a form of private
property.1 27 They went on to 12
cite an earlier case suggesting that a patent is a privilege
"conditioned by a public purpose." 8

S. Bravo Sys., Inc. v. Containment Technologies Corp.. 96 F.3d 1372. 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Rule 38
sanctions were imposed against Bravo and its counsel, with joint and several liability. Id.
"5

116 Id.

117Id. at

1377.

Lueck et al., supra note 87.
119Nathan Myhrvold, Inventors Have Rights, Too!, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2006, at A14.
18

120 Id.

.21
Id. The judge in the case also mentioned that the Blackberry maker's litigation tactics were "egregious"
and "fraudulent," even though the party was painted as the victim by the media. Id.
122 Brief of Business Software Alliance, et al. as Acmicie Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 19, eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange. L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130).

123DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, VOLUME 8 § 22.01 (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 2006)
(stating that patents are subject to general legal rules on the ownership and transfer of property).
124 Brief of Business Software Alliance, et al., supra note 122, at 29.
12535 U.S.C. § 261 (2006).
121 Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co.. 210 U.S. 405. 425 (1908).
127 Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 381 (1945).
12IId. at 382 (citing Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 32 U.S. 661, 666 (1833)).
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Reserving the privilege of enforcement only for patents that have a public purpose is a very
vague standard by which to judge. Certainly Eli Whitney's cotton gin would be considered to
serve a public purpose, but what about the Blackberry communication device? It may be used by
teenagers to email their friends, but it is also used by the government to communicate with
contractors and private parties. 129 Ultimately, the very basic public purpose of protecting an
individual's intellectual property is served by all patent licensing or litigation activities.130
The trend toward recognition of intellectual property as a valuable asset was spurred on
greatly in 2003, after many internet start-up companies went bankrupt.131 Many of the companies
that went out of business had valuable patents that could be enforced against large corporations
that had built on the technology. 132 The treatment of patents as property is culminating in the
formation of a bank that will insure, sell, appraise, and leverage intellectual property just like any
other asset. 133 The patent's fate of being treated like traditional property appears to be sealed in
the economic sector. 134 If only certain types of patent holders could enforce their intellectual
property rights, the value of a patent would change depending on who owned it. As a result, this

129Brief of Business Software Alliance, et al., supra note 122, at 29. The Department of Justice filed a
statement of interest in the Blackberry/RIM litigation explaining that the government had a substantial interest in
ensuring that any injunction entered would not interfere with government users. Id. at 30. The Justice Department
further stated that "the federal government may have a further interest in this case to the extent that it is vital for it
to be able to communicate in real-time with private parties, including government contractors, through
Blackberry T devices." Id.
13"Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 8, eBay, Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130).
A general rule enjoining infringement of valid patents promotes the public interest. Stopping
such infringement of valid patents serves as the economic incentive to create the new and nonobvious subject matter that, once publicly disclosed via the patent, permits that advance in
technology to be further refined, extended and improved.
Id. Brief of Amicus Curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America in Support of Respondent at 6.
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange. L.L.C.. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130). "Courts have consistently concluded
that the public interest almost always receives greater benefit from a functioning and reliable patent system." Id.;
see also Brief of Rembrandt IP Management, LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 5, eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange. L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130) (asserting that "non-practicing entities play a key role
in a system designed to promote progress by protecting invention").
The exclusive property right created by the patent has several public benefits. It assures the
inventor compensation for the work of successful invention. It allows the inventor to disclose
the invention to the public and to potential investors without the fear of unlicensed imitation or
appropriation. And it encourages investors which could be the patent-holder himself, his
licensee, or outside financiers to risk capital in bringing the invention to market. Without the
incentives and protections afforded by the patent grant. far fewer inventions would be
disclosed to the world in the same timeframe. None of these critical functions could be
performed effectively if the patent right, like any property right in a capitalist system, were not
freely transferable.
Id. at 5.
131Lisa Lerer, Going Once?, IP LAW AND BUSINESS, Oct. 1, 2005, at 45.
132Id. (stating the director of intellectual property law at Altera Corporation, Derek Minihane, asserted that
storage and e-commerce are hot areas, so those type of patents sell for unusually high prices at bankruptcy
auctions).
133Id. (explaining the vision of Ocean Tomo, a new type of IP bank, which likens itself to a nineteenthcentury merchant bank, employs fifty-five engineers, lawyers, and business people that will use intellectual property
as valuable leverage for financing).
'34 Kirby. supra note 344, at 1. "James Malackowski, Ocean Tomo's president and
CEO, said he sees the
value of patents following the same course as home mortgages have over the past 20 years.... [I]ntellectual
property is becoming an investable asset for the first time." Id.
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would severely limit the ability to freely trade and sell rights in patents.135 This law would be as
ludicrous as a law that a person owning a home purely as an investment could not sell it for as
much as a person who also occupied the home they were selling. It should be up to each patent
holder whether to practice the invention or sell the patent rights, and that choice should not be
taken from them by an arbitrary determination of whether a patent holder is serving the public
good.

III. PROPOSAL
Patent Troll is a prejudicial, imprecise, and subjective label. 13 6 Commentators have largely
used it as a euphemism for problems with the current patent system. 137 Rather than cowering in
fear of the imagined troll, it is better to examine the actual underlying issues that the troll
embodies. Part A of this section explores fears about the patent system that form the basis for
discrimination against NPEs. Part B of this section discusses fears about the quality of patents
granted by the USPTO, which are the basis of allegations that Patent Trolls make frivolous claims.
Part C of this section examines the fear of injunction, which is the underlying motivation for a
push to only allow enforcement of patents for the public good.

A. FearAbout Changes in PatentEnforcement

Use of the term NPE sums up the prejudice that exists against patent holders that do not
practice the patents they hold. 38 This animosity stems from the angst of large manufacturers and
high tech companies, who used to be essentially untouchable by individual patent holders accusing
them of infringement. 139 Large entities are accustomed to using their considerable
resources to
140
outlast an individual inventor in court by dragging out the litigation for decades.
With the advent of contingent fee patent representation, individual inventors can enlist the
help of companies and law firms specializing in the area to match the resources of a large
corporation's intellectual property division. 141 Also, companies with large patent portfolios
traditionally could use their patent holdings as a shield against other large companies in their

135 Brief of Rembrandt IP Management,
COMMISSION,
13'

supra note 130, at 2; see also

ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION

supra note 4, at 8.

Lueck et al.. supra note 87: see also Kirby, supra note 34, at 1 (quoting the chief executive of Acacia

referring to the label "patent troll" as a term with no substance).
137 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 3 (asserting that the phrase "patent troll" is
now used as a placeholder for all the ills perceived in the patent system).
131 Id. at 8 (asserting that it is important that proposed patent legislation is evaluated based on real data, not
hyperbolic anecdotes). Detkin states that he understands the frustration of his colleagues in large technology
companies, but the impact of patent troll lawsuits is exaggerated. Id.
'3' Brief for Respondent, supra note 27, at 48 (stating that injunctive relief for the
small entity is still
appropriate even if a large-company infringer is discomfited when sued by a small-entity patentee that cannot be
threatened with a patent countersuit).
140 Myhrvold, supra, note 119, at A14; see also Hofman, supra note 60 (detailing
legal struggles of patent
holders against large corporations).
14 Kirby. supra note 344, at 1. One industry watcher asserts that these 1P representation
firms are at the
"forefront of an evolution of intellectual property... acting as brokers between the idea generators and the product
developers." Id.
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industry, so when they
are accused of infringement, they accuse the other company of
14
infringement in return. 2
However, the shield is useless against a non-practicing entity, so these large companies are
refocusing their efforts on spreading Patent Troll myths and arguing to "weaken patent laws for
the little guy.", 143 The landscape of patent enforcement is changing and although change is scary
for some, the end result is that all patent holders now have a better opportunity to enforce the
intellectual property rights they are entitled to. 144
Preliminary results of a recent study indicate that of patent infringement lawsuits filed in the
last five years, NPEs filed about two percent." 5 This is a very small percentage to have inspired
so many to cry "troll." Rembrandt IP Management, a proudly self declared NPE, argues that
NPEs "play a valuable role in a system of free enterprise in which all property rights, including
intellectual property rights, are (and must remain) freely tradable." 14 6 Since NPEs focus solely on
realizing the value of the patent through licensing and enforcement on behalf of the inventor, the
inventor spends more time focusing on inventing. 147
A distinction drawn between practicing and non-practicing entities does not make sense as14a
basis for discrimination because almost all patent holders are non-practicing to some degree. 1
This could be because the inventor lacks the resources to practice the invention or it may not be
practical to do so. Also, many companies hold patents that are part of clusters of related patents
142Myhrvold, supra note 119, at A 14.
143 Id. (asserting that big tech companies would rather campaign to weaken patent laws for the little
guy than

to pay out a small fraction of their huge profits to a legitimate patent holder).
144Id.; see also ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 6. Detkin coins another colorful
term in his written testimony, "patent squatters:"
In sharp contrast to the anecdotal arguments about patent trolls, real data shows that 'patent
squatters' are an actual and growing problem. A person who moves into a house or apartment
without the permission of the owner is called a squatter and is not tolerated .... Yet this is
precisely what happens in the intellectual property world. Witnesses for high-tech companies
freely admit that they do not perform any patent clearance studies before releasing their
products .... The current 'head in the sand' approach that is the current standard operating
procedure should not be viewed as acceptable to anyone. Companies that market products
without patent clearance routinely ignore the valid patent property rights of others, demanding
that an inventor go to litigation rather than provide fair compensation for the invention short of
litigation.
Id. at 6.
15 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION. supra note 4, at 9; see also Myhrvold, supra note 119, at A14
(asserting that of the two percent of patent lawsuits brought by non-practicing entities, the vast majority are
perfectly legitimate companies or universities).
146Brief of Rembrandt IP Management, supra note 130, at 1.
147 Id.; see also Lueck et al., supra note 87.
"[S]ociety as a whole benefits from the licensing and
enforcements efforts ofmany. for they allow the distribution and use of patented technology." Id.
Efforts of patent licensing companies, small companies, non-manufacturing companies and
others have three key benefits: (1) they reward inventors; (2) they provide opportunities for
small inventors; and (3) they prevent large companies from poaching innovation from small
companies or individual inventors. These three benefits support the underlying goal of the
U.S. Patent System fostering innovation.
Id
48 Brief for Respondent. supra note 27, at 14. "Virtually all patent holders are 'non-practicing' to a degree.
and even if it were possible to distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' non-practicing entities, such distinctions not
only have little, if any, basis in the facts of this case, but also involve policy judgments more appropriately left to
Congress." Id.; see also Lueck et al., supra note 87. Another reason that a distinction between practicing and nonpracticing entities is unnecessary is that the court already addresses this difference in the remedies available to the
patent holder for infringement. Id. A patent holder who is manufacturing a patented product may receive lost
profits, but a patent holder not doing so can only get a reasonable royalty, which is usually much less. Id.
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and even companies practicing some patents are unlikely to be practicing all the patents that they
hold. 149
The Supreme Court in the recent eBay case rejected the idea that different standards should
be used for an NPE as opposed to a practicing entity. 1" ° The Court asserted that all patent holders
could be entitled to an injunction and they named NPEs, such as university researchers or selfmade inventors that could meet the test set forth for an injunctive remedy.151
Whether called non-practicing entities or Patent Trolls, every holder of a patent should be
able to fully enforce all of the legal rights conferred by it. 152 Simply because some large
companies are not used to facing patent holders with the ability to enforce their patent rights is no
reason to take rights away from all NPEs.

B. Fear of Too Many Patents and Rampant Enforcement
Allegations of frivolous claims brought by Patent Trolls against other companies are a mask
for uncertainty about the quantity and quality of patents granted with the thin resources of the
USPTO.153 These patent concerns should be addressed by proposed changes
in the structure of the
15 4
USPTO, not by taking rights away from a certain class of patent holders.
Some industries, like biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, are diligent about performing
patent studies so that they do not lose years of research on a product that is infringing on someone
else's patent.155 However, in fast moving industries like electronics and software, being the first 156
to
market with the newest technology has often taken precedence over meticulous patent studies.
A witness from a high-technology company before Congress freely admitted that these
companies
157
usually do not perform any patent clearance studies before releasing their products.
Simply because there are so many patents synthesized into high-technology products is no
excuse to overlook anyone's legitimately obtained patent rights. 158 One industry insider claims
that many of the largest companies in the computer industry have a policy that prevents engineers
from reading patents or performing prior art searches to determine whether their work infringes on
a patent. 159 The reason given for this is patent studies are expensive and a "distraction" that might
slow down the time to market of products. 16
The CEO of Intellectual Ventures asserts,
"weakening patent laws, whether in the Supreme Court or Congress, is no more than a government
161
bailout of the infringement problems big tech companies deliberately made for themselves."
14' Brief for Respondent. supra note 27, at 49.
150eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1844 (2006).

151Id. at 1840.
152 Myhrvold, supra note 119, at A14. "Without full [enforcement] rights there is no way for a small inventor
to get a big infringer to the table to settle. Instead, they'll stall and drown the little guy with legal fees." Id. at 2.
153See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 9.
154 Id. at 6.
155Myhrvold, supra note 119. at A14.
156 Id.

4, at 6.
(asserting that some high tech companies argue that full product clearance is not possible either

157 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, supra note
151 Id.

because the products are too complex or because so many patents issue long after the technology is integrated into
their products). "While these are valid criticisms, they do not excuse a complete lack of effort. The current 'head
in the sand' approach that is the current standard operating procedure should not be viewed as acceptable to
anyone." Id.
151Myhrvold, supra note 119. at A14.
160 Id.
161 Id.
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The menacing troll stories are a sign of the fear some companies have about changing their
162
entire business model to incorporate respect for the intellectual property holdings of others.
Requiring companies across all industries to perform more prior art
searches before producing a
3
product can not be called anything but a step in the right direction. 16

C. Fears about Being Enjoinedfrom Production

There is an argument that patents are a property right, subject to the caveat that the courts
only enforce them to protect the public good. 164 This is a position maintained by companies who
are scared that they will be enjoined from doing business by one rogue patent holder who has
nothing to lose by dragging them to court. 16' However, this distorts the actual rights conferred by
a patent and is an exaggeration of the threat posed by a patent holder suing for infringement. The
American patent system has rules in place to balance the public interest against enjoining a
profitable company from doing business and courts should be trusted to adhere to those rules when
deciding whether to grant an inj unction. 166
From the early nineteenth century until eBay in 2006, an injunction was practically automatic
upon a finding that a valid patent was being infringed. 167 During that time, however, some courts
refused to grant injunctions when doing so was not in the public interest. 16 These exceptions
included not enjoining use of an infringing railroad brake in use on 15,000 cars and not enjoining
operation of a city water treatment plant. 169 After eBay, the standard for granting an injunction in
a patent case gives even more weight to the public interest than before.1"0 The common thread is
that the Court has always recognized the need to balance the public interest in determining what
remedies are appropriate in patent infringement cases. Any additional restrictions placed on patent
enforcement related to the "public good" are unnecessary on top of these already equitable
standards.
It is precisely for the promotion of the public good that we protect a patent holder with the
right to exclude others from using, making, selling, or offering for sale the patented invention.171
So far, the American patent system has been extraordinarily successful at fostering innovation. 112
162See

id.

163 Id. Myhrvold asserts that the crux of the debate about Patent Trolls is differing corporate cultures and

attitudes about the patent system. Id.
in some industries, like pharmaceuticals or biotech. patents are crucial to the business model,
so they support and respect patent rights. Tech companies, on the other hand, win by muscling
their way to sufficient market share to become a de facto standard (some would say
monopoly). Because patents don't figure in this business model, tech companies don't hold
the patent system in high regard. Patents are simply not a priority for many tech companies.
Ebay, for example, has only II issued patents.

Id

64 Brief of Amicus Curiae Pharmaceutical Research. supra note 130, at 4.
165See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 4.

166eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
167id.
68

1 d. at 1841.

169

City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934); Nerney v. New York, 83 F.2d 409

(2d Cir. 1936).
170Jonathan Muenkel and Eric Lee. The eBay Effect, IPL NEWSLETTER, Fall 2006, at 15.
17 Lueck et al., supra note 87.
172Committee Print Regarding Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 133 (2005) (statement of Richard
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The patent grant, conferring intellectual property rights in an invention, provides incentives to
U.S. inventors and allows the U.S. patent system
to grant patents for ten times as many significant
173
inventions as the rest of the world combined.
Fear over effects of the growing number of Patent Trolls has led many to jump to the
conclusion that the United States must limit the right to enforce a patent only where it serves the
public good. 17 4 The existing standards to determine when an injunction will issue already take the
public good into account, and it is excessive to suggest further stringent requirements on certain
patent holders. All patent holders are a vital part of the successful American17patent system, and
they deserve to retain the full spectrum of patent rights the system has to offer. 5

IV. CONCLUSION

The Patent Troll label is an inflammatory and offensive term that has no real meaning. It is
useless in defining any one type of patent holder based on behavior or characteristics.1 76 Large
companies who have never felt so threatened by individual patent holders have simply used it as a
retort. 177 The term is also useless in defining a group of patent holders whose rights to
enforcement should be limited. Enforcement of a patent must be available to all holders of
patents, regardless of who they are or what their business goals are. 17 8 When this right is secure,
the patent system can continue to retain and even
increase the incentive to invent, which has been
1 79
the core aim of the system since its inception.

Levin, President, Yale University), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/109th/20709.pdf.
"High rates of technological innovation, especially in the 1990s but continuing to this day, suggest that the patent
system is working well and does not require fundamental changes." Id.
173
Lueck et al., supra note 87.
174Brief of Business Software Alliance, et al., supra note 122, at 29.
175Committee Print Regarding Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Propertyof the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 133 (2005) (statement of Nathan
Myhrvold) at 140. Small inventors "do the bulk of America's inventing and they deserve our support." Id.at 140.
176
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 3.
177 Philip
Mann,
Patent Holding Companies
Unfairly
Trashed, Nov.
19,
2004,
http://www.iplitigationblog.com/patent-lawsuit-news-patent-holding-companies-unfairly-trashed.html.
Mann
characterizes the bashing of patent trolls as disdain that large companies exhibit toward small patent holders. Id.
He says, "I think what's really being said here is that companies could rush their products to market faster if they
didn't need to worry about such niceties as not infringing patents. particularly those belonging to others." Id.
...
See Myhrvold. supra note 119.
179Id.
The patent system exists to give economic incentive to create inventions not products. After
all, profit is the incentive to create and sell products. In order to have a level playing field,
inventors must have a full set of rights, regardless of whether they are big or little, or whether
they make products or just invent.

